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ABSTRACT
Despite the robust structure of the Internet, it is still sus-
ceptible to disruptive routing updates that prevent network
traffic from reaching its destination. In this work, we propose
a method for early detection of large-scale disruptions based
on the analysis of bursty BGP announcements. We hypothe-
size that the occurrence of large-scale disruptions is preceded
by bursty announcements. Our method is grounded in anal-
ysis of changes in the inter-arrival times of announcements.
BGP announcements that are associated with disruptive up-
dates tend to occur in groups of relatively high frequency,
followed by periods of infrequent activity. To test our hypoth-
esis, we quantify the burstiness of inter-arrival times around
the date and times of three large-scale incidents: the Indosat
hijacking event in April 2014, the Telecom Malaysia leak
in June 2015, and the Bharti Airtel Ltd. hijack in November
2015. We show that we can detect these events several hours
prior to when they were originally detected. We propose an
algorithm that leverages the burstiness of disruptive updates
to provide early detection of large-scale malicious incidents
using local collector data. We describe limitations, open chal-
lenges, and how this method can be used for large-scale
routing anomaly detection.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet, although extremely robust [10], is notoriously
vulnerable to attack by means of the Border Gateway Pro-
tocol (BGP) [6]. BGP exchange messages are assumed to be
trustworthy. In other words, the reachability information
shared between autonomous systems (ASes) is assumed to
be correct without any verification. Despite the fact that the
latest version of the BGP protocol was released in 2006 [45],
there are no inherent protection mechanisms against partici-
pants advertising false routes.
In practice, BGP lacks authenticationmechanisms not only
for the announcement of the origin of IP prefixes but also
the paths to that prefix. This leaves BGP vulnerable to un-
intended misconfiguration and malicious attacks [15]. The
results of these disruptions include (i) traffic blackholing and
(ii) interception. In traffic blackholing, the network traffic is
dropped, never reaching its destination [11]. In traffic inter-
ception, the announcing AS reroutes traffic for the victim IP
prefix and redirects it to the original origin AS after intercep-
tion [12]. On this misdirected route, the trafficmay be subject
to eavesdropping [4], traffic analysis [53], or tampering [50].
Well-known examples of BGP anomalies include the China
Telecom hijack in 2010 [22], the targeted interception of U.S.
Internet traffic through Iceland and Belarus in 2013 [44],
and the large Indonesia ISP hijack in 2014 [55, 66]. During
the China incident, a routing update caused a large fraction
of the world’s Internet traffic (approximately 50,000 IP pre-
fixes) to be redirected to China Telecom. This constitutes
a very well-known example of a blackhole. A more recent
incident was initiated by Indonesia’s largest communication
provider, Indosat. This incident was even larger than the
China Telecom incident. The Indonesian ISP hijacked more
than 320,000 routes. This means that Indosat laid claim to
roughly two-thirds of the Internet for almost three hours.
These were all identified only the after widespread diffusion
of the incorrect routing information.
The current approaches to the challenges of routing anom-
alies rely on (i) cryptographic authentication or (ii) anomaly
detection. Cryptographic protocols include the Resource Pub-
lic Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [32] for origin authentication,
and BGPSec [33] which offers the ability to authenticate an
entire path. These approaches are powerful, but there has
not been widespread adoption [13]. This may be because of
processor requirements, memory requirements, or a lack of
incentive alignment [20]. Cryptographic solutions are also
expensive. Perhaps more importantly, it has been shown that
even with their widespread adoption, it will be not possible
to avoid the occurrence of route leaks, such as the Malaysian
incident in 2015 [37, 57].
Anomaly detection approaches rely on measuring the
control-plane (using BGP feeds) or the data-plane (explor-
ing reachability of IP addresses in suspicious announced
routes), or a combination of both. Anomaly detection does
not require changes in the protocol itself. They primarily
are used in detecting anomalies based on passive or active
measurements in order to alert operators for mitigation and
response [27, 51, 54, 63]. Anomaly detection approaches are
reactive because they identify harm after disruptive updates
have polluted some detectable threshold of ASes with fake
announcements.
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Here we propose a detection method that aims to identify
incipient incidents before diffusion and harm, by identifying
a routing event as it emerges. Our goal is to identify events
several hours prior to the state-of-the-art detection method,
BGPmon [54]. To do this, we use control-plane data collected
by the RouteViews [38] and served by BGPStream [43]. The
key observation in our anomaly detection method is that
there are bursty BGP announcements before new routes are
adopted by neighbor ASes. We characterize bursty announce-
ments through statistical analysis of inter-arrival times. We
conduct a case-based systematic analysis of the changes of
inter-arrival times that are associated with three well-known
anomalous events. This paper provides the following contri-
butions:
(1)Wevalidate our conjecture that inter-arrival time
patterns of BGP announcements are a useful signa-
ture for early identification of large-scale routing in-
cidents. (Section 4.2) We show that bursty patterns of an-
nouncements are noticeable before the detection of the inci-
dents by the current state-of-the-art detection system [54].
To do so, we quantify the burstiness of BGP announcements
by observing that when there are large-scale incidents, there
are groups of announcements with short inter-arrival times
followed with larger ones. We report that this observation is
independent of the volume of announcements.
(2)Wedescribe the design of a proof-of-concept BGP
anomaly detection method that uses data only from
current route collectors. (Section 4.3) We use RouteViews
route collectors to compute a detection signature of large-
scale incidents based on the impact of short inter-arrival
times. We discuss how it is possible to anticipate more clearly
when an incident is imminent depending on the view of a
specific collector (quantified by the number of router feed-
ers).
(3) We report results of a longitudinal analysis of
large-scale routing incidents. (Section 4.4) We evaluated
the proposed method by studying three different large-scale
routing incidents, i.e., Indosat in April 2014, TelecomMalaysia
in June 2015, and Bharti Airtel Ltd. in November 2015. Our
approach allows for statistically significant differentiation be-
tween normal behavior and disruption or anomalous changes
during the incidents. The three cases we address were easily
identified following the large-scale disruptions but not be-
fore. Description of the incidents and reasons for selecting
them are in Section 3.1.2.
We will provide access to the data collection and analysis
scripts for reproducibility purposes.
2 RELATEDWORK
The detection method presented in this paper is informed
by past research in (1) detection and (2) mitigation of BGP
anomalies. Here we provide an overview of related works in
these two areas.
2.1 Detection of BGP anomalies
BGP anomaly detection approaches are usually classified
based on the type of data that is used for the task. In that
respect, there are: (i) control-plane, (ii) data-plane, and (iii)
hybrid approaches. Control-plane approaches passively mon-
itor BGP updates or routing tables from a distributed set of
BGP monitors [27, 30, 49]. These approaches look for in-
consistencies in the origin of prefixes announced by ASes
or unexpected path changes. In particular, the work in [30]
proposes a Prefix Hijack Alert System (PHAS). PHAS re-
lies on the idea of finding unique prefixes simultaneously
originating from multiple ASes—also referred as Multiple
Origin AS conflicts. Once these conflicts are detected, this
method filters false positives using additional information
from the network operators, e.g., checking announcements
of similar prefixes from different ASes that belong to the
same organization. In contrast, the work in [27] focuses on
correlating suspicious route announcements with past net-
work announcements. This method can detect anomalies
that have a huge impact, i.e., announcements that pollute a
considerable number of paths. Control-plane methods are
usually designed to be implemented as a third-party services
such as BGPmon [54]. They have been effective in detect-
ing large-scale events but tend to report a large number of
false positives [48, 64]. To deal with these shortcomings, the
work in [49] proposes ARTEMIS. ARTEMIS is an AS self-
operated detection system that exploits local configuration
and real-time BGP data from public monitoring services. In
contrast with previous control-plane approaches, ARTEMIS
provides protection among different types of attacks, includ-
ing man-in-the-middle traffic manipulation, within a minute
of detection delay. All the previously mentioned methods
are reactive and notify routing anomalies after the incident
occurred. The proposed method belongs to the control-plane
category. In contrast with previous methods, it relies on
analyzing real-time BGP updates from the route collector
perspective and is able to anticipate when a large-scale event
is going to occur with several hours of anticipation. Our
method is able to detect in advance a wide variety of attacks
including traffic interception and route leaks.
Data-plane approaches use ping/traceroute to detect anom-
alies in the route of data [63, 65]. These approaches rely on
monitoring the reachability of routes from the victim to
detect anomalies. The work in [65] proposed a distributed
scheme for detecting BGP anomalies based on departures of
hop count stability and AS path similarity. Following this
methodology, the work in [63] proposed iSPY. iSPY generates
an alarm every time the reachability of a predefined prefix
2
is not observable from multiple vantage points. Data-plane
approaches are able to pinpoint suspicious path changes in
the traffic which results in higher detection accuracy. How-
ever, they do not scale well since they require a considerable
number of active measurements for characterizing regular
paths and have large latency [60]. Data-plane approaches
are complementary to the proposed method, but they are
reactive in terms of being able to detect anomalies once they
are widely spread and do not allow the ability to anticipate
when an event is incipient.
Hybrid approaches have been developed to address the lim-
itations of exclusively control- and data-plane methods [24,
51]. Themain idea behind hybrid approaches is to use control-
plane inconsistencies to inform data-plane measurements,
i.e., by exploring the reachability of packets in a particular
network. The work in [24] explored this idea by proposing
a framework that launches data-plane probes only when
anomalous update messages are received. This system was
intended to be used as customized software installed in the
routers. Following this idea, the work in [51] introduced
Argus. Argus is an automated system that detects prefix
hijacking and deduces the origin of the anomaly. Argus is
based on pervasively correlating control- and data-plane data
during a given time period to detect anomalies including
sub-prefix hijacks. The proposed method is able to identify
sophisticated attacks as those that are able to be identified
by hybrid approaches without using data-plane information.
It allows predictive occurrence of anomalies relying only on
control-plane information.
2.2 Mitigation of BGP anomalies
Several proposals to secure BGP are based on the use of
public-key cryptography for the authentication of route an-
nouncements [26, 33, 42]. Cryptographic-signed messages
allow the verification of the identity of ASes that claim a
certain route. They are based on the RPKI for assignment
and distribution of public keys [32]. The RPKI designates
a hierarchy of authorities based on RIRs (regional Internet
registries) to allocate and authorize IP space in BGP through
the use of digital signatures and public key certificates. RPKI
allows secure origin authentication.
The use of the RPKI alone does not require changes in
the BGP protocol. The RPKI is an out-of-band mechanism
in which routers download information for decision making
and does not require the use of online cryptography. How-
ever, there are reasons that limit the scope of the RPKI for
securing BGP. Researchers have debated the agreement of
a trusted Certificate Authority [8], difficulties to correctly
configure the RPKI [58], a general lack of commitment and
incentives to lead their implementation [13], and its permis-
siveness to certain types of attacks, e.g., path shortening
attacks [15].
To remedy limitations with respect to the type of attacks
that can be undetectable with only origin validation, path
validation proposals have been discussed. As opposed to
origin validation, path validation proposals authenticate ev-
ery AS in the path of a corresponding announcement. The
work in [26] proposed secure BGP (S-BGP) to validate path
attributes in BGP updates messages. Information in S-BGP
is validated in the RPKI. This is done through the use of
attestations, i.e., signed messages that verify the authenticity
of route announcements. Address attestations are statements
signed by known authorities that map Autonomous System
Numbers (ASNs) to prefixes to verify that the ASes origi-
nating the route were eligible to do so. Route attestations
are statements signed by ASes and operationalized in the
AS-PATH attribute. They are used for each AS in the path
attribute to confirm that the next AS in the path has received
the announcement and was the right to forward it. S-BGP
provides full authentication of origin and path through at-
testations. Along the same lines, another proposal is secure
origin BGP (soBGP) [42]. soBGP relies on the RPKI for han-
dling public keys to soBGP speaking routers, maintaining
certificates of routing policies, and authentication of IP space
and ASes. soBGP relies on a graph topology database to val-
idate policy interactions between ASes. Update messages
violating AS topology policies are dropped. Note that the
graph topology database used in soBGP is relatively static
given that the topology will only change when there is a
change in the policy agreements. By contrast, S-BGP per-
forms attestations every time there is a new update.
Another proposed standard is BGPSec [33]. BGPSec builds
on RPKI to distribute and manage cryptographic keys that
are used to sign and authenticate every AS on the path of
a corresponding announcement. In contrast to S-BGP and
soBGP, BGPSec is an integral part of the BGP protocol re-
quiring online cryptography in which routers sign and verify
every message that they sent. This creates computational
overheads and requires routers hardware upgrades. This eco-
nomic incentive, for network operators, makes it difficult
to think of in its fully implementation [15]. In the context
of partial deployment, the work in [36] shows that BGPSec
alone does not offer a significant security improvement when
compared with only RPKI usage under certain routing policy
scenarios.
Although RPKI and path validation proposals are able to
offer BGP protection against a wide variety of attacks, they
fail when trying to avoid the adoption of leaked routes. A
route leak occurs when an AS announces valid routes beyond
their intended scope, i.e., the AS announces a route that is in
violation of the receiver, the sender and/or one of the ASes
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along the preceding AS path [52]. These types of anomalies
still can generate blackholes and are even prone to traffic
interception [16]. Our proposed method is lightweight and
able to detect in advance malicious route manipulation and
route leaks.
For a comprehensive surveys on BGP anomaly detection
and mitigation methods, we refer the reader to the works
in [2, 6, 39].
3 METHODS
To provide early indicators of large-scale disruptions, we
leverage the statistic-based anomaly detection method SRI
NIDES used in the intrusion detection context [25]. Essen-
tially, our method considers route announcements as signals
with expected patterns of behavior and detects deviations
from the expected patterns. Our focus is on inter-arrival
times rather than the specific content of the announcements
themselves. Claiming illegitimate ownership of a significant
fraction of the Internet requires transmitting correspond-
ingly bursty announcements causing large perturbations in
the patterns of route announcements.
Using this approach requires accurate, time-stamped his-
torical BGP announcements. Section 3.1 provides details on
the data source. The source of the data for the construc-
tion of the database of the large-scale routing anomalous
events (to establish the ground truth) is BGPSteam and is
described in Section 3.1.1. The focus is on the study of well-
known incidents identified in Section 3.1.2. The measure of
burstiness that was used to characterize the occurrence of
the incidents is described in Section 3.2; and the resulting
detection method is detailed in Section 3.3. This work does
not include human subjects and as such is exempt from IRB
oversight.
3.1 Data sources
3.1.1 BGP data. We collected BGP updates (announce-
ments and withdrawals) using BGPStream1. Update times-
tamp accuracy is one second. BGPStream provides an open-
source software framework for the analysis of historical and
real-time BGP data [43]. To do so, BGPStream extracts data
directly from route collectors. A route collector (collector,
hereafter) is a host running a collector process. The collector
emulates a router that establishes BGP peering sessions with
BGP routers. These collection points are real routers known
as feeders. There are two popular projects running route
collector processes, RouteViews [38] and RIPE RIS [46].
At the time of this writing, RouteViews and RIPE RIS
operate 22 and 23 collectors which peer with hundreds of
feeders [17]. We acknowledge that there are other sources
1Available at https://bgpstream.caida.org/
of BGP data, including network operators, other route col-
lector projects such as BGPmon [61] (from Colorado State
University2), and Packet Clearing House [23]. However, pre-
vious research has shown that there is a considerable overlap
between the measurements from RouteViews and RIPE RIS
projects [7]. In addition, as pointed out in [18], RouteViews
provides the more complete view of the Internet in terms of
IP prefix coverage. Therefore, we only collected BGP updates
from RouteViews.
3.1.2 Routing anomalous events. Our data collection is
based on a subset of BGP updates that cover the time before,
during, and after selected incidents. We collected approx-
imately seven days of observations around the start date
of each of them. The purpose of collecting data over this
time period is to be able to distinguish between regular and
anomalous behavior. We consider these exceptional routing
incidents because of their impact to the Internet, the sheer
number of prefixes, and the fact that these incidents have
not previously received detailed academic analysis so that
we could not know their patterns of diffusion in advance.
Details about the incidents and their respective dates and
times are listed below. Events are listed in chronological or-
der. Note that these anomalous events have been studied and
corroborated from different sources. To summarize:
An Indonesian ISP hijacks the world. On April 2, 2014,
starting at 18:26 UTC, Indosat (one of the largest telecom-
munications providers in Indonesia) announced more than
320, 000 IP prefixes belonging to other networks. Indosat
announced roughly two-thirds of the entire Internet address
space [55, 66]. A large fraction of the hijacked prefixes be-
longed to Akamai, which is one of the larger Content De-
livery Networks. This incident lasted approximately for 2.9
hours until 21:15 UTC. Traffic continued to be delivered;
however, the path of the traffic was significantly altered.
Global collateral damage of theTelecomMalaysia leak.
On June 12, 2015, starting at 08:43 UTC, Telecom Malaysia
announced about 179, 000 IP prefixes to Level 3 (the largest
crossing AS) [37, 57]. Level 3 accepted these announcements
and then propagated the routes to their peers and customers
around the word. Because Telecom Malaysia is a customer
of Level 3, the routes announced by Telecom Malaysia were
identified as a preferred delivery route for Level 3. This event
caused a significant packet loss and Internet service degrada-
tion around the world. Level 3 suffered a significant blackout
from the Asia pacific region and the rest of the world. Note
this was a leak, so the data were not delivered after being
transmitted to TelecomMalaysia. This incident lasted approx-
imately 2.7 hours. At around 10:40 UTC there were slowly
2This refer to the free BGP monitoring service available at
https://www.bgpmon.io/
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observed improvements, and by 11:15 UTC the errors in the
Routing Information Base (RIB) [45] began to be resolved.
Large scale BGP hijack in India. On November 6, 2015,
starting at 05:52 UTC, Bharti Airtel Ltd., claimed the own-
ership of about 16, 123 IP prefixes. These addresses corre-
sponded to more than two thousand unique ASes [41, 56].
This event became widespread because two large ASes (e.g.,
Cogent Communications and GlobeNet Cabos Submarinos
S.A.) accepted and propagated these routes to their peers
and customers. Legitimate owners of the prefixes included
Akamai, Tata Communications, and Apple Inc. This incident
lasted approximately 8.9 hours until 14:40 UTC.
3.2 Burstiness of announcements
Let XA→B = {XA→B (t)}, t = 0, 1, . . . ,N be a time series of
time-stamped announcements sent by AS A and received by
collector B. Let τA→B be a random variable that represents
the time interval between consecutive announcements so
that τA→B takes values in {XA→B (1) − XA→B (0),XA→B (2) −
XA→B (1), . . . ,XA→B (N ) − XA→B (N − 1)}. Burstiness refers
to the tendency of certain events to occur in groups of rel-
atively high frequency, i.e., short inter-arrival time inter-
vals, followed by periods of relatively infrequent events [21].
Mathematically, it can be characterized by analyzing the
inter-arrival time distribution P(τA→B ). As was proposed
in [14], the inter-arrival distribution can be characterized by
a burstiness factor defined by B = σ−µσ+µ . Here σ and µ denote
the standard deviation and mean of the inter-arrival time
distribution. Note that the burstiness has a value of −1 for
σ = 0, which means regular time intervals. It has a value of
0 for σ = µ in the case of random time intervals. Finally, it
has a value of 1 for σ → ∞ and a finite µ in the case of a
highly bursty time series of announcements.
3.3 Detection method
We leverage the measure of inter-arrival times as received
by the collectors to compute a measure of intensity based on
the burstiness of announcements. This measure was origi-
nally used in the context of intrusion detection in [25]. Let
QA→B be the number of announcements sent by AS A and
received by collector B exponentially weighted. This means
that more current announcements have a greater impact in
its computation, i.e., short inter-arrival times. The value of
QA→B is computed using the recursive formula
QA→B (t) = 1 + 2−r∆QA→B (t − 1). (1)
Here r is the decay factor and ∆ = XA→B (t) −XA→B (t − 1) is
the inter-arrival time between consecutive announcements.
The decay factor r determines the half-life ofQA→B (t). Large
values of r imply that the value ofQA→B (t) is more influenced
by more recent announcements. Smaller values of r imply
that the value of QA→B (t) will be more heavily influenced
by announcements in the distant past. Detection focuses
on identifying observations in the time series of QA→B , for
which its value exceeds a threshold that is a function of the
mean and standard deviation. We use the moving average
and moving standard deviation as the mean and standard
deviation estimators respectively. The parameter ω is the
window length in the moving average model. The parameter
δ controls how many standard deviations are considered to
report an event. The complete pseudocode for the detection
algorithm can be found in Appendix A.
4 RESULTS
In this section, we analyze the previously described BGP
incidents. We analyzed the views from several data collectors
at various locations around the world. Table 1 in Appendix B
shows the geographical location and the date of the first
dump of the collectors used in this study3. We analyzed BGP
announcements and withdrawals, but the withdrawals did
not effect our results, perhaps in part because the volume
of withdrawals is significantly less [9, 31, 59]. Our results
presented here include only announcements.
We conduct four different but complementary analyses.
First, we monitor the dynamic behavior of the number of
feeders peering with each collector (Section 4.1). To this
end, we perform a longitudinal analysis that spans over 17
years to quantify the trends in contribution of feeders to the
collectors. This analysis shows the timewhen some collectors
started attracting or being disconnected from some feeders—
we relied on the number of routers for this. A large number
of feeders produces a robust view of Internet activity. This
indicates the time-frame when collectors could construct
a representative view of Internet activity. This analysis is
complementary to the works in [17, 18] that focused on a
single month of observations and other works [9, 34, 59, 62]
that analyze a stream of BGP updates as seen from a single
collector.
Second, we show how each of the large-scale incidents is
perceived from the point of view of the different collectors
(Section 4.2). To do so, we measure the number of announce-
ments received by the collectors before, during, and after the
incident. We study how announcements vary based on the
number of feeders into a particular collector. We found that
the incident can be viewed more clearly from those collectors
with more feeders. This is particularly true for collectors in
North America and Europe. Some collectors are unable to de-
tect the incident because, with a small number of feeders, the
collector is unable to construct a robust view of the Internet.
This is a result of the low number of feeders peering with
3Collectors’ location and date of the first dump were obtained from Route-
Views and BGPStream respectively.
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the collectors, as exemplified in the case of several African
countries [19].
Third, we analyze the inter-arrival times of announce-
ments at the collectors (Section 4.3). We characterize these
with a measure of burstniess used previously for studying
human dynamics in [5, 14]. This allows us to quantify the
burstiness of announcements before, during, and after the
incidents. We show that ASes involved in the reported inci-
dents exhibit a statistically significant change in the inter-
arrival pattern of their BGP announcements at the collec-
tors. We show that for early detection of BGP incidents, the
volume of messages is not enough for incident detection.
In contrast, the burstiness of the announcements sent by
ASes and seen for a specific collector is a complementary
discriminator to the volume of announcements and helps
identify anomalous behavior. More importantly, we show
that changes in burstiness occur several hours before the
incidents were reported in practice.
Fourth, we propose a method for detecting anomalous
announcements based on quantifying the burstiness of an-
nouncements that are received by the collectors (Section 4.4).
This allows us to characterize the distinguishing features
that occur before the incidents. Given these distinguishing
features, we introduce a detection algorithm and evaluate its
effectiveness using real-stream data obtained from collectors
during the incidents.
4.1 Feeder contribution analysis
To quantify the number of feeders peering with each col-
lector, we parse RIB dumps of each collector and count the
number of unique peering routers. We counted the number
of unique routers on the first day of each month at noon
for 195 consecutive months from October 2001 to December
2017. This allowed us to study the evolution of the number
of feeders per collector.
Figure 1 shows the time series of the number of feeders
based on the number of routers. We see that, in general, that
there is an increase in feeders over time. In particular, route-
views.linx, route-views.saopaulo, and route-views4 report
the highest number of feeders by the end of the observa-
tion period. Conversely, route-views.kixp, route-views.soxrs,
and route-views.wide show a significantly lower number
of feeders, confirming the recent findings by Gregori et al.
in [19].
There are also some collectors with fluctuations in this
time period. In particular, the number of peering routers
seems to decrease by mid 2016 for route-views.saopaulo and
route-views4. Despite this, even more importantly, route-
views4 has the highest feeder count. This is important to our
work because the capacity to detect the incidents depends on
collectors having a robust view of the Internet so that they
may construct an accurate baseline. Therefore, collectors
need to have a minimum number of feeders to be able to see
the incident.
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Figure 1: Time series of the number of routers peering with
collectors. Collectors are ordered in alphabetical order. Ma-
jor ticks correspond to nine-month intervals while minor
ticks correspond to one-month intervals.
4.2 Collectors’ disruption perception
We show observations during a seven-day period around
the occurrence of the incidents. These are highlighted in the
plot between the two vertical dashed lines as reported by the
state-of-the-art BGP anomaly detection systemBGPmon [54].
We ranked the collectors in decreasing order by the number
of feeders. We show the view from the four collectors with
the highest number of feeders and offer complete details
(as well as data and Python scripts upon request) for the
remaining collectors. Note that the events are observable by
analyzing the view of the four collectors before the incidents
were reported by leading third-party services including as
Oracle Dyn and BGPmon respectively [55, 66].
Indosat incident. Figure 2 shows the number of announce-
ments received from the AS responsible for the incident, i.e.,
AS 4761. This incident is perceived differently at each collec-
tor. The incident is almost unnoticeable for collectors with a
low number of feeders (route-views.soxrs, route-views.perth,
and route-views.kixp with 2, 3 and 3 feeders respectively).
For the other collectors, two things happen. First, there is
a significant increase in the number of received announce-
ments. This increase is almost four orders of magnitude in
the majority of the cases. Second, the frequency at which the
announcements are received is higher than other announce-
ments that are not close to the occurrence of the incident, i.e.,
around the highlighted region. This last observation implies
shorter inter-arrival times in the proximity of the incident.
6
It is worth noting that for the collectors which received an-
nouncements, this striking behavior is perceived almost four
hours before the incident.
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Figure 2: Time series of the number of announcements from
AS 4761 that collectors received before, during, and after the
Indosat incident in 2014 for the top four collectors. Major
ticks correspond to six-hour intervals whileminor ticks cor-
respond to two-hour intervals.
Telecom Malaysia incident. Figure 3 shows the number
of announcements received by every collector, recall the
originator is AS 4788. Some collectors observe an increase in
burstiness in announcements received prior to the incident.
The number of announcements increases up to four orders
of magnitude. Even more importantly, these announcements
occur highly intermittently and frequently. As in the case
of the Indonesia incident, some collectors did not see the
behavior that we are describing, e.g., route-views.sorxs and
route-views.kixp, with two and four feeders respectively.
Note that this pattern of behavior occurs almost three hours
before the incident was detected.
Bharti Airtel Ltd. incident. Figure 4 shows the number of
AS 9498 announcements received by the collectors. As with
Indonesia and Malaysia, the incident is seen more clearly
from some collectors than from others, and from some not
at all. For collectors where the incident would have been
detectable, the number of announcements increases up to
five orders of magnitude. Note that the the bursty behavior of
the announcements right before the incident is less intense
than in the previous cases. Again, this burstiness is clearly
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Figure 3: Time series of the number of announcements from
AS 4788 that collectors received before, during, and after the
Telecom Malaysia incident in 2015.
noticeable several minutes before the incident was detected
on the network.
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Figure 4: Time series of the number of announcements from
AS 9498 that collectors received before, during, and after the
Bharti Airtel Ltd. incident in 2015.
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4.3 Inter-arrival time analysis
There is both a significant increase in the number of arrivals
of announcements before the incident (see Section 4.2) and a
dramatic increase in the frequency at which these announce-
ments are received by the collectors. The following analysis
reveals that the inter-arrival time of announcements as seen
by the collectors exhibits a significant degree of burstiness.
To ground the results, we first analyze the joint distribution
of activity of each AS based on the burstiness (horizontal
axis) and the number of announcements (vertical axis) during
one full day of measurements around the incident. Collectors
are ranked in decreasing order by number of feeders. We pro-
vide details for the top four collectors in this work. To assure
an accurate assessment of burstiness, we only consider ASes
that sent more than 100 announcements during this time
interval [28]. We marked with “squares” the ASNs of the top
five ASes based on CAIDA’s customer cone size ranking [1],
i.e., AS 3356, AS 1299, AS 174, AS 2914, AS 3257. They pro-
vide a baseline for comparison. We mark with a “star” the
ASN that was responsible for the incident. The dark cells
indicate a high concentration of ASes with a characteristic
burstiness and number of announcements.
Second, we test if the apparent effect is real or is it due to
chance. In particular, we apply a Monte Carlo test in which
the null hypothesis is that ASes send announcements in a
bursty manner even during times where there is no evidence
of a BGP incidents. For this analysis, we collected time series
of announcements over a full day of observations where no
BGP incidents have been detected. One hundred of these
random time series were compiled for each collector for the
top five ASes (again based on CAIDA’s customer cone size
ranking) and the AS involved in each incident. In each of
these 100 time series, we compute the ASes associated bursti-
ness. Here we provide the results for the top four collectors
based on the number of feeders, again with data and details
for the other collectors available upon request.
Indosat incident. Figure 5 shows that during the incident,
most of the ASes have a burstiness that is below 0.90 (the 93th
percentile) and produce fewer than 106 announcements (the
97th percentile). There are dashed lines on these percentiles.
Note that the AS represented by the star (i.e., Indosat) has the
highest burstiness. Note also that those ASes in the second
quadrant (with more than 106 announcements) have a con-
siderable number of announcements but lower burstiness
(i.e., AS 27738, AS 9829, AS 53062, AS 36998, AS 29571). These
ASes appear consistently among the different collectors but
were not reported to be involved in the incident. Conversely,
those ASes in the fourth quadrant show high burstiness, but
the number of announcements is not significant (i.e., AS
7629, AS 61125, AS 9497, AS 132045). We found that those
ASes are not neighbors of Indosat (corroborated through [1])
nor involved in the incident. This empirical finding reveals
that although the volume of announcements increases for
different ASes during the incident, the actual AS involved
in the incident has a distinct burstiness pattern that starts
several hours before the incident was reported. This obser-
vation is complementary to the works in [9, 31] in which a
significant increase in the volume of announcements is used
as a detection signature, as well as illustrating the benefit of
including a measure of burstiness.
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Figure 5: Joint distribution based on the the burstiness (hor-
izontal axis) and number of announcements (vertical axis)
during one day interval around the Indosat incident.
Figure 6 shows notched box plots comparing the bursti-
ness calculated from different collectors for the baseline ASes
and the AS involved in the incident (the last one) under the
null hypothesis. Notched box plots have a contraction around
the median whose height is statistically important. When
notches of the boxes overlap, there is not a statistically sig-
nificant difference between the medians. In this case, these
plots illustrate that the burstiness of each of the ASes under
study are not significantly different when there is no inci-
dent. However, the observation highlighted with the cross
corresponds to the test statistic for the observations derived
during the interval of the incident. As can be seen, for col-
lectors receiving announcements from the AS involved in
the incident, this observation lays outside the region of sta-
tistical indistinguishably. This suggests that the burstiness
during the incident is statistically significant different, and
it is unlikely that such values would be observed under ran-
dom conditions. This argument reinforces the argument that
the volume of announcements is a necessary but not suffi-
cient feature for early detection of large-scale BGP incidents
(see Fig. 5). High burstiness is a distinctive feature in these
incidents.
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Figure 6: Monte Carlo test for burstiness. Last column cor-
responds to the observations of the AS responsible for the
incident, AS 4761. The test statistic, the burstiness observed
during the interval of the attack, is marked with a cross.
Telecom Malaysia incident. Figure 7 shows that the AS
involved in the incident has a distinct characterization in
the distribution, i.e., AS 4788. It has both high burstiness
and number of announcements. Most of the ASes have a
burstiness that is below 0.90 (the 99th percentile) and pro-
duce less than 106 announcements (the 99th percentile). Note
that there are ASes that sent a high number of announce-
ments and do not have high burstiness compared to Telecom
Malasya (those in the second quadrant), e.g., AS 9892, AS
9829, AS 9583. These ASes were not involved with the inci-
dent nor are they neighbors of TelecomMalaysia. Conversely,
the ASes in the fourth quadrant have higher burstiness but
fewer announcements compared to Telecom Malaysia, e.g.,
AS 28681, AS 10208, AS 8402, AS 45209. These are not neigh-
bors of Telecom Malaysia but there is no evidence of mali-
cious updates coming from them.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of burstiness computed
over 100 samples of random one day intervals. The burstiness
of TelecomMalaysia is highlighted with the cross. This figure
shows that the burstiness of the AS that was involved in the
incident is statistically significantly larger when compared to
its own normal behavior (e.g., baseline and null comparisons).
Bharti Airtel Ltd. incident. Figure 9 shows that the bursti-
ness of AS 9498 is not as high as the burstiness of the per-
petrators of the incidents in Indonesia and Malaysia. Here
most of the ASes have a burstiness that is below 0.90 (the
99th percentile) and produce fewer than 106 announcements
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Figure 7: Joint distribution based on the total number of an-
nouncements and their burstiness during one day interval
around the Telecom Malaysia incident.
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Figure 8: Monte Carlo test for burstiness. The last column
corresponds to the observations of the AS responsible for
the incident, AS 4788.
(the 99th percentile). However, for the majority of the col-
lectors, Bharti Airtel sent a large number of announcements
that placed it in the second quadrant. However, there are
other ASes in the second quadrant, e.g., AS 262949, AS 9829,
AS 36408, AS 28573, AS 21669. From these, AS 9829 and AS
36408 are customers of AS 9498. Conversely, we find that
AS 394104, AS 11139, AS 133722, and AS 42040 have high
burstiness and relatively fewer announcements, but they are
not neighbors of AS 9498 nor involved with the incident.
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Figure 9: Joint distribution based on the total number of an-
nouncements and their burstiness during the one day inter-
val around the Bharti Airtel Ltd. incident.
Figure 10 shows the Monte Carlo test for AS 9498 and
the top ranked five ASes. We observe that the burstiness
of AS 9498 is at the boundary of the distribution but not
as significant as in the Indonesia and Malaysia cases. This
reflects the fact that for this incident, announcements were
less bursty. They are significant when compared with the
normal behavior of AS 9498.
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1. route-views.linx 2. route-views4
12
99 17
4
29
14
32
57
33
56
94
98
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
3. route-views.saopaulo
12
99 17
4
29
14
32
57
33
56
94
98
4. route-views2
ASN
B
u
rs
ti
n
e
ss
Figure 10: Monte Carlo test for burstiness. The last column
corresponds to the observations of the AS responsible for
the incident, i.e., AS 9498.
4.4 Anomaly detection
The main idea of our anomaly detection method relies on
profiling the expected behavior of a signal and then detecting
deviations from the expected pattern. To do so, we rely on
the measure of burstiness of announcements as perceived
by the collectors. Analyzing the volume of announcements
can be misleading, and adding the measure of burstiness
has two advantages. A high volume of announcements may
be caused by BGP session resets and other vendor specific
behaviors [59]. It enables earlier detection of anomalies and
decreases the number of candidates to be examined as po-
tential anomalies (e.g., quadrant two in Figs. 5, 7, 9).
To evaluate burstiness, we compute the time series QA→B
for each incident, based on equation (1). The solid line rep-
resents the value of QA→B (t) for each arriving unique an-
nouncement message at time t . In accordance with previous
studies in [29, 62], we verify that most of inter-arrival times
of announcements are less than 300 seconds (the 99th per-
centile for most of the collectors). We then use 300 seconds as
the half-life value to capture most of routing dynamics. Then
the decay factor is set to be r = 1/300. Each horizontal gray
band represents one standard deviation from the moving
average using the same window length. We use ω = 20 as
the estimator for the window length because it is the lowest
value that reduces the mean square error between the em-
pirical observations and the moving average. The darkness
of the bands indicates the distance from the means based on
Algorithm 1. Observations that lay more than two standard
deviations away from the moving average are marked with
stars, i.e., we use δ = 2. Note that the values of r , ω, and δ
may be tuned for detection purposes.
Indosat incident. Figure 11 shows that almost four hours
before the event was reported, Q4761→B is more than two
standard deviations away from the moving average. Inter-
estingly, the data from route-views.linx— the collector with
the highest number of feeders— is the first to deviate from
the mean, specifically 3 h 43 min and 2 seconds before the
earliest detection of the incident. The deviations of the other
collectors are later but still hours before the incident was
actually detected. Note these outliers do not show up at other
dates or times of the time series.
Telecom Malaysia incident. Figure 12 shows the time se-
ries of QA→B for four collectors. The value of Q4788→B is
more than two standard deviations almost four hours before
the incident was reported by BGPmon. Here the collector
with the more anticipated observation is route-views4, with
anomalous readings clear 3 h 51 min and 2 seconds before
detection. Note also that route-views.saopaulo reports no
outliers, meaning that the perceived burstiness is not as high
as for the other collectors (see Fig. 7).
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Figure 11: Q4761→B time series for the Indosat incident.
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Figure 12: Q4788→B time series for the Telecom Malaysia in-
cident.
Bharti Airtel Ltd. incident. Figure 13 shows that collec-
tors observe anomalies in advance of the detection of the
incident. However, route-views2—the collector that received
the burstiest signal according to Fig. 9—observes these out-
liers only 25min before. The lower impact may be correlated
with lessor potential for advance notice, but there is no data
to assert this as a conclusion.
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Figure 13:Q9498→B time series for the Bharti Airtel Ltd. inci-
dent.
5 DISCUSSION
Routing anomalies caused by bothmisconfigurations andma-
licious intent have tested the resilience of Internet core pro-
tocols [40]. Here, we propose an anomaly detection method
and show that it would identify three large scale anomalies
significantly in advance when compared with the state-of-
the-art method [54]. To do so, we analyze inter-arrival times
of BGP announcements leveraging the RouteViews collector
infrastructure. We found that the burstiness, along with the
volume of announcements, has the potential to provide early
warnings of routing anomalies before they are evident using
traditional control-plane and data-plane approaches. We be-
lieve that the proposed method is a complement to current
anomaly detection approaches.
To validate the effectiveness of the proposed method, we
conducted analysis for three cases of large-scale routing
anomalies (see Section 3.1.2 for more details). We have evalu-
ated the statistical significance of announcement burstiness,
before, during, and after the events. We found that the per-
petrators of the incidents have statistically significant bursty
patterns that are visible from the collectors several hours
before the incidents were reported by others. We analyze
the same features under the null case (of no incidents) and
corroborate that the bursty behavior is characteristic of an-
nouncements sent prior the detection of the incidents. By
relying on this key observation, we propose an algorithm to
identify when there is an incipient anomalous incident. The
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data and scripts used in this research will be made available
for reproducibility purposes.
The proposed method would be effective against hijacks,
route leaks, and other misconfigurations. Having noted the
potential for our approach, we are also aware of some limi-
tations of our proposed work.
Real-time data availability: Our analysis is based on BGP
announcements received by RouteViews collectors. Only
a subset of these collectors support real-time monitoring
through BGPmon4. The RouteViews data used in our anal-
ysis relies on BGPStream, which has an access delay of ap-
proximately 20 min [49]. One option for further research
is to run these experiments with a reduced number of cur-
rent real-time RouteViews collectors through BGPmon. In
addition, RIPE RIS provides an API to access real-time BGP
updates for a limited number of collectors. Through sharing
our scripts, we hope that individual collectors could imple-
ment this approach and report the results in the future.
Feeder contribution:Our method treats each router contri-
bution as equivalent. In fact, they vary significantly in terms
of IP space coverage as shown in previous research [17, 18].
Unknown efficacy for subtle attacks:We evaluated our
method for large-scale high-impact routing incidents, both
hijacks and route leaks. However, we do not investigate other
attack configurations that are used for more subtle attacks.
This analysis excludes incidents such as when U.S. Internet
traffic was rerouted through Iceland and Belarus in 2013 [44]
and routing attacks on cryptocurrencies [3].
Focus on early detection but not mitigation: We pro-
pose an anomaly detection method that allows early iden-
tification of BGP large-scale incidents. To do so, the effec-
tiveness of our proof-of-concept is evaluated based on its
ability to detect incidents before state-of-the-art detection
methods. Yet we do not discuss mitigation strategies once
the events are detected, e.g., prefix deaggregation [35]. Of
course, these mitigation strategies can be implemented on
top of our proposed method to avoid wide diffusion of route
misinformation.
Burstiness is a complement to volume measurements:
Burstiness needs to be measured simultaneously with the
volume of announcements. As confirmed by the results for
the Indosat incident (see Section 4.4), burstiness and vol-
ume of announcements must be combined to reduce false
positives and to provide early detection of the incidents.
Overhead in route collectors: Route collectors are instru-
ments used for measurement in our proof-of-concept. For
implementation purposes, the detection method might most
effectively be implemented at the collectors.We do not expect
4Here BGPmon refers to the free monitoring service develop by Colorado
State University available at https://www.bgpmon.io/
these processes to impose significant overhead on the collec-
tors, but we have no actual performance measurements.
6 CONCLUSION
When BGP was originally implemented, the operators of
the control plane were part of a small community with high
levels of trust and technical expertise. The vulnerability of
the BGP trust model has since been proven by mistake and
malfeasance. The proposed solutions to this have included
cryptographic protocols for ensuring trustworthy informa-
tion from trustworthy sources as well as methods for identi-
fication and remediation of incidents when they occur.
As a complement to current anomaly identification ap-
proaches, we have demonstrated a proof-of-concept that
identifies real hijack incidents several hours before these
were detected in practice by leveraging the current Route-
Views collectors’ infrastructure. We have characterized three
high-impact large-scale BGP anomalies from a different per-
spective, one derived by analyzing the patterns of burstiness
of BGP announcements. The proposed method relies on the
fact that large-scale disruption events produces groups of
BGP announcements of relatively high frequency followed
by periods of relatively infrequent events, which can be mea-
sured as burstiness. Relying on this observation, we describe
a detection method that is able to indicate in advance, from
a collector point of view, when an incident is incipient.
A natural extension of the proposed characterization is
the study of bursty patterns around other malicious BGP
anomalous events, ones at smaller scale. It is possible that
the burstiness measure can bemore robust against less severe
attacks, i.e., when a lower number of networks are hijacked.
In this work, we have explored our hypothesis under the
conditions of large service disruptions (including an event
that compromised roughly two-thirds of the Internet). Fu-
ture work includes examining how these frequency patterns
change with smaller events. Such future analysis relies on
the proper identification and labeling of past events.
Additional future work includes examining the effective-
ness of the proposed method with real-time BGP updates
from different collector projects. BGPmon provides real-time
BGP feeds from several feeders as well as some collectors
in the RIPE RIS project. The approach in this paper can be
also tested with a protocol specifically designed for mon-
itoring purposes, such as the OpenBMP protocol [47]. An
implementation of a prototype for anomaly detection based
on the principles of this paper seems feasible with the avail-
ability of real-time data from different projects available in
BGPStream. We also offer our scripts and collaboration to
collectors that seek to use this locally.
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APPENDIX
A ALGORITHM
Below we include the pseudocode of the detection algorithm
described in the paper in Section 3.3.
Algorithm 1 Event-Detection (XA→B , r , ω, δ )
1: QA→B ← {} ▷ Number of announcements
2: for t in XA→B do
3: QA→B ← QA→B ∪ {1 + 2−r∆QA→B (t − 1)} using eq. (1)
4: end for
5: Ψ← moving average(QA→B, ω )
6: Σ← moving std(QA→B, ω )
7: Eˆ ← {}
8: for t in {0, 1, . . . , N } do
9: if QA→B (t ) >= (Ψ(t ) + δΣ(t )) then
10: Eˆ ← Eˆ ∪ {t }
11: end if
12: end for
13: return Eˆ
B COLLECTORS’ DETAILS
Below we include details about the location and date of the
first dump of the collectors described in the paper in Section 4.
14
Table 1: Geographical location and date of first dump of col-
lectors. Collectors are ordered in alphabetical order.
Collector name Location First dump
route-views.chicago Chicago, IL, US 2016-06-28 12:00
route-views.eqix Ashburn, VA, US 2004-05-17 13:59
route-views.isc Palo Alto, CA, US 2003-11-27 02:00
route-views.jinx Johannesburg, ZA 2012-07-10 00:00
route-views.kixp Nairobi, KE 2005-10-07 15:44
route-views.linx London, GB 2004-03-16 13:45
route-views.nwax Portland, OR, US 2014-03-20 20:52
route-views.perth Perth, AU 2012-11-15 21:48
route-views.saopaulo Sao Paulo, BR 2011-03-17 16:19
route-views.sfmix San Francisco, CA, US 2015-04-14 20:00
route-views.sg Singapore, SG 2014-06-04 15:44
route-views.soxrs Belgrade, RS 2014-01-01 00:00
route-views.sydney Sydney, AU 2010-08-14 02:00
route-views.telxatl Atlanta, GA, US 2012-02-02 22:46
route-views.wide Tokyo, JP 2003-07-01 21:29
route-views2 Eugene, OR, US 2001-10-26 16:48
route-views3 Eugene, OR, US 2013-11-25 10:00
route-views4 Eugene, OR, US 2008-11-28 09:53
route-views6 Eugene, OR, US 2003-05-03 12:29
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